My research spans ethics, metaphysics, moral psychology, social philosophy, and philosophy of religion. My publications have covered free will, moral responsibility, manipulation, blame, moral standing, personal identity, the nature of heaven, freedom in heaven, the desirability of the immortality, and the value of regret.
I'm working on several projects at the moment. I describe a few of these below.
I'm working on several projects at the moment. I describe a few of these below.
Responsibility Over Time
Most philosophers have been concerned with determining the conditions on becoming morally responsible. In this project, however, I am concerned with the conditions on remaining responsible - that is, what does it take after one has become responsible for an action for one to remain responsible as time passes?
Most philosophers have been concerned with determining the conditions on becoming morally responsible. In this project, however, I am concerned with the conditions on remaining responsible - that is, what does it take after one has become responsible for an action for one to remain responsible as time passes?
The Nature and Ethics of Apology
When we have been wronged, we are typically owed an apology from the wrongdoer. But what happens when the wrongdoer is a group, such as country? In this project, I investigate this question and the nature and ethics of apology more generally.
When we have been wronged, we are typically owed an apology from the wrongdoer. But what happens when the wrongdoer is a group, such as country? In this project, I investigate this question and the nature and ethics of apology more generally.
The Nature and Ethics of Honour and Admiration (with Alfred Archer)
Is it appropriate to honour and admire athletes, artists and intellectuals who have performed immoral actions? In this project, we identify moral reasons against honouring and admiring the immoral and we suggest ways to improve our honouring and admiring practices.
Is it appropriate to honour and admire athletes, artists and intellectuals who have performed immoral actions? In this project, we identify moral reasons against honouring and admiring the immoral and we suggest ways to improve our honouring and admiring practices.
Moral Responsibility for Acting Out of Character (with Robert Hartman)
Philosophers have widely agreed that it is possible for an individual to be morally responsible for an action that is "out of character". This possibility has been taken to undermine character-based accounts of moral responsibility. In this project, we investigate the nature of out of character actions and the "out of character" objection to these accounts.
Philosophers have widely agreed that it is possible for an individual to be morally responsible for an action that is "out of character". This possibility has been taken to undermine character-based accounts of moral responsibility. In this project, we investigate the nature of out of character actions and the "out of character" objection to these accounts.
Non-Moral Blame (with Per-Erik Milam)
We often blame people for violating non-moral standards. For example, we might expect a director to make a great film and then blame her for making a bad film. In this project, however, we argue non-moral blame is almost always inappropriate.
We often blame people for violating non-moral standards. For example, we might expect a director to make a great film and then blame her for making a bad film. In this project, however, we argue non-moral blame is almost always inappropriate.